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FLORIDA SENATORS ADDRESS SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD
GLENDA THORNTON
"The fundamental right to have children either through procrea-
tion or adoption is so basic as to be inseparable from the rights
to 'enjoy and defend life and liberty, [and] to pursue happiness
S)q1
ON MARCH 31, 1987, a New Jersey trial court decided one of
the most highly publicized and controversial cases in this
country's history.2 Although $10,000 was in dispute, it definitely
was not the object of the litigation. Rather, the focus of the case
was a little girl known only by a pseudonym, "Baby M." The issue
in the Baby M case, the legitimacy of surrogate motherhood, had
an effect that reached far beyond New Jersey's borders and found
its way onto the floor of the Florida State Senate during the 1987
Regular Session.3
In response to the Baby M case,' Senate Bill 1081 was intro-
duced in April, 1987, to address the issue of surrogate mother-
hood.' The Senate bill recognized the need to regulate the complex
arrangements whereby a woman enters into a surrogate mother-
hood agreement. She is then artificially inseminated with the se-
men of a (typically married) man, carries the child to term, and
then surrenders all parental rights to the natural father whose in-
fertile wife adopts the baby.' Due to the difficulties many infertile
couples face when trying to adopt a child,' the surrogate parenting
arrangement is an increasingly popular alternative.8 Although Sen-
1. Grissom v. Dade County, 293 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 1974).
2. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987),
cert. granted, 107 N.J. 140, 526 A.2d 203 (N.J. 1987).
3. Fla. CS for CS for SB 1081 (1987).
4. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary-Civ., SB 1081 (1987) Staff Analysis (final May 26,
1987) (on file with committee) [hereinafter S. Judiciary-Civ. Analysis].
5. FLA. S. JOUR. 199 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 28, 1987).
6. See Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U.L. JOUR. 147.
7. Fewer women are putting their children up for adoption than ever before. This de-
crease in adoptable children is the result of an increase in the use of contraception, and the
lessened stigma of raising illegitimate children resulting in an increased number of unwed
mothers choosing to keep their children. See Griffin, Womb for Rent, STUDENT LAWYER, Apr.
1981, at 29.
8. Approximately 20,000 babies are conceived through artificial insemination each year.
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ate Bill 1081 failed in the Florida House of Representatives,9 it was
the Florida Senate's first attempt to take a stand on an issue that
will have a tremendous effect on family law, contract law, constitu-
tional fundamental rights to procreation, and the states' interests
in the health and welfare of its citizens.
I. STATE OF THE LAW
A. Florida
Prior to the introduction of Senate Bill 1081, the Florida Legis-
lature had not specifically addressed the issue of surrogate parent-
ing arrangements."0 The Adoption Act contained a provision deal-
ing with the payment of compensation in adoption situations.
Section 63.212(1)(d), Florida Statutes, makes it unlawful to sell,
arrange for the sale of, or to receive a child in exchange for money
or other valuable consideration." This section also distinguishes
adoptions by relatives or stepparents by allowing the payment of
medical expenses incurred by the biological mother. Enacted in
1973,12 section 63.212(1)(d) evidences the Florida Legislature's
long-standing concern about "baby-selling." It is also a reminder
that adoptions by relatives of the child are special situations and
should be examined more leniently.
The Florida Legislature also voiced concerns about the evils of
baby-selling in a section directed at those who are usually the most
unscrupulous in such situations, the middlemen or intermediaries.
Section 63.097, Florida Statutes, states that any fee in excess of
$500 paid to an adoption intermediary must be approved by the
court prior to payment, unless it is for actual, documented medical,
hospital, or court costs.'3 Florida set the maximum intermediary
fee in an attempt to ensure that couples and prospective mothers
are not exploited by these middlemen.
Another aspect of surrogate parenting arrangements, the process
of artificial insemination, is addressed only once in the Florida
Statutes. Section 742.11 declares that there is an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of legitimacy in situations where a child conceived
9. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1987 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS
at 260, SB 1081.
10. G. Newman & S. Newman, Surrogate Parenting Part 1, 2 FLA. FAM. L. REP. 123, 126
(June 1987).
11. FLA. STAT. § 63.212(d) (1985).
12. Ch. 73-159, § 21, 1973 Fla. Laws 312, 321.
13. FLA. STAT. § 63.097 (1985). But cf. Fla. CS for SB 1062 at § 8 which increased the fee
limit to $1,000.
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through artificial insemination is born within wedlock and the hus-
band of the biological mother consents in writing to the insemina-
tion.14 In the state's eyes, the husband is the child's natural fa-
ther. "' Obviously, this law is in direct conflict with one of the
surrogate arrangements' most positive attributes: recognition of
the biological father lessens the apprehension many opponents
have about the agreements because the child is not placed in the
custody of a stranger, but rather is cared for by its "real" father.' 6
These statutory provisions were the only ones even indirectly
relevant to surrogate parenting arrangements in the spring of 1987
when Senate Bill 1081 was introduced. There were no attorney
general opinions or administrative decisions dealing with this novel
form of parenting. Furthermore, no Florida court decisions even
mention the words "surrogate parenting arrangements."
However, in Grissom v. Dade County,'7 the Florida Supreme
Court reviewed an action brought by an indigent widow attempting
to adopt a child whose mother had abandoned her. The plaintiff
sought to either have Dade County pay the costs of publication or
to have the law requiring her to incur the costs of notifying the
absent mother by publication declared unconstitutional in its ap-
plication. She alleged that she was precluded from court solely on
the basis of her wealth because she was unable to pay the publica-
tion costs. The court held for the plaintiff finding the law unconsti-
tutional as applied and noted that there exists a fundamental right
to have children which is so basic that it cannot be distinguished
from other constitutional rights recognized in this country.'8 Thus,
in Grissom, Florida's highest court acknowledged that procreation
is a fundamental right and set the stage for a future surrogate
party to challenge the limits of this right.
B. Other Jurisdictions
1. New Jersey
New Jersey was the site of the most famous surrogate parenting
case to date. In In re Baby M,' 9 the natural father and his wife
14. FLA. STAT. § 742.11 (1985).
15. Id.
16. See Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of The Problems and Suggestions
For Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REV. 71, 91 (1982); see also Keane, supra note 6, at 152.
17. 293 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1974).
18. Id. at 62.
19. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), cert. granted, 107
N.J. 140, 526 A.2d 203 (N.J. 1987).
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sued to enforce a surrogate parenting contract to compel the surro-
gate mother to surrender custody of the infant after she kidnapped
the child and fled to Florida. The trial court reached the following
conclusions: 1) the contract provision prohibiting abortion unless
the natural father consented was unenforceable; 2) the contract
was not one of adhesion, unconscionable or voidable in the absence
of fraud; 3) the surrogate mother breached the contract by failing
to surrender the child; 4) the best interests of the child were the
court's main concern; 5) the laws of adoption were inapplicable;
and 6) the $10,000 consideration was not unconscionable. Since the
Florida legislation at issue deals primarily with adoption law and
compensation to surrogates, the court's two final findings are the
most pertinent.
First, Judge Sorkow reasoned that adoption laws were inapplica-
ble because they were created when surrogate parenting arrange-
ments were unheard of and not a "viable procreation alterna-
tive."2 ° Second, the court reasoned that it would be a violation of
equal protection if surrogate mothers were not allowed compensa-
tion for their services.21 In reaching this decision, the court relied
on a comparison between a surrogate mother and a surrogate fa-
ther, a sperm donor. According to Judge Sorkow, "[i]f a man may
offer the means for procreation then a woman must equally be al-
lowed to do so."22 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has granted
certiorari in the Baby M case. It will be interesting to see whether
the supreme court upholds the trial court's ruling and, if so, on
what grounds.
Despite the notoriety of Baby M, it was not New Jersey's first
opportunity to tackle the issue of payments to surrogates in excess
of expenses. In In re Adoption of a Child by I.T. and K.T.,23 pro-
spective adoptive parents filed a complaint for adoption. The trial
judge acted, sua sponte, to deny relief, reasoning that a violation
of the adoption laws prohibiting "trafficking in babies" rendered
the adoption illegal.24 However, the appellate court concluded that
although the payments violated the adoption statutes, the adop-
tion should be upheld because it was the court's overriding duty to
apply the best interests of the child standard, and the best inter-
20. Id. at 372, 525 A.2d at 1157.
21. Id. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1165.
22. Id. This argument is by far one of the most persuasive in favor of compensation for
surrogates.
23. 164 N.J. Super. 476, 397 A.2d 341 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
24. Id. at 480, 397 A.2d at 342-43.
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ests of the child were to remain in the custody of the prospective
adoptive parents.28 Based on this case law, New Jersey's present
position regarding surrogate parenting is that the only applicable
standard is what is in the child's best interest.
2. Arkansas
Currently, Arkansas is the only state that has passed legislation
dealing specifically with the issue of surrogate parenting. 26 Accord-
ing to the Arkansas statute, if a child conceived through artificial
insemination is born to a married woman, her husband is pre-
sumed to be the natural father if he consents to the insemination.
Additionally, the statute states that the woman giving birth is the
presumed mother even if she is unmarried.28 However, there is one
very relevant exception to these statutory provisions. If the unmar-
ried woman who conceives through artificial insemination is a sur-
rogate, then the woman who is expected to adopt the child will be
considered its legal mother. Initially, the surrogate's name will ap-
pear on the birth certificate. However, a substituted certificate can
be issued by court order which will bear the adoptive mother's
name.
Arkansas' approach to regulating surrogate parenthood is novel,
and the procedure has not been challenged in court. Therefore, the
legal effect this approach will have on surrogate parenting in Ar-
kansas is still unknown. It is interesting to note, however, that Ar-
kansas distinguishes between unmarried and married mothers by
recognizing surrogate parenthood when the surrogate is unmarried,
but creating additional obstacles when she is married.
3. Michigan
The state of Michigan first encountered a controversy involving
payment to surrogate mothers in Doe v. Kelley.29 Doe involved a
suit by a married couple who contracted with a surrogate to bear
the husband's child. The couple brought suit against the state At-
torney General, Frank J. Kelley, in an effort to have the statutes3 0
prohibiting payment in adoption proceedings declared unconstitu-
25. Id. at 484, 397 A.2d at 344.
26. Newman & Newman, supra note 10, at 127.
27. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-720 (Supp. 1985).
28. Id. at § 34-721(B).
29. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
30. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 710.54, 710.69 (West 1987).
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tional 1 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the statutes did
not interfere with the plaintiffs' right to privacy and their right to
make contractual arrangements to adopt a child.32 The statutes
merely prohibited the plaintiffs from paying consideration while
using the state's adoption procedures. 3 Although the decision
never expressly banned surrogate parenting, it had the equivalent
effect. Even though some women become surrogates without the
added incentive of payment, some commentators believe that most
potential surrogate mothers will not risk the dangers of pregnancy
without additional compensation. 3
A more recent Michigan decision, Syrkowski v. Appleyard,s5
gave the state supreme court an opportunity to issue a ruling on
the surrogate issue. In that case, a married woman was artificially
inseminated with the plaintiff's semen, pursuant to a surrogate
parenting agreement. The surrogate mother was paid $10,000 in
addition to her medical expenses. A Michigan statute31 similar to
section 742.11, Florida Statutes, 7 named the surrogate's husband
as the legal father if he consented to the insemination. The trial
court held that the court did not have jurisdiction to decide the
issue. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding
that the court did have jurisdiction to hear the biological father's
request where he and the biological mother entered into a surro-
gate parenting agreement.3 8 The supreme court in Syrkowski de-
clined to address the issue of compensation. Thus, the Doe holding
still stands as a prohibition against payment for a surrogate
mother's promise to bear a child by means of artificial
insemination.
4. Kentucky
The Kentucky Supreme Court recently had occasion to consider
the issue of surrogate parenting in Surrogate Parenting Associates
Inc. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky. 9 The Kentucky Attorney
General, David Armstrong, did not limit his opposition to surro-
31. Doe, 106 Mich. App. at 170, 307 N.W.2d at 439.
32. Id. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
33. Id. at 174, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
34. See Comment, Womb for Rent: A Call for Pennsylvania Legislation Legalizing and
Regulating Surrogate Parenting Agreements, 90 DICK. L. REv. 227, 235 (1985).
35. 420 Mich. 367, 362 N.W.2d 211 (Mich. 1985).
36. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 333.2824(6) (1980).
37. FLA. STAT. § 742.11 (1985).
38. Syrkowski, 420 Mich. at 367, 362 N.W.2d at 211.
39. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
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gate parenting arrangements to his official opinions. 40 Instead, he
initiated suit to revoke the license of a corporation that arranged
surrogate parenting."1 The Attorney General asserted that the cor-
poration misused its corporate powers and harmed the welfare of
the state. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected this ar-
gument and held that the corporation's involvement in surrogate
parenting did not contravene the statute prohibiting purchasing a
child for purposes of adoption.
First, the court reasoned that the evils of baby-selling are not
present in surrogate arrangements because the agreement is en-
tered into before conception. 42 This, according to the court, is sig-
nificant because the surrogate mother's concerns are not the
problems presented by unwanted pregnancy or the added financial
burden of raising a child. Instead, she has the opportunity to seri-
ously consider her options long before she is impregnated.
Second, the court considered surrogate motherhood similar to in
vitro fertilization,'43 which the statute expressly stated was not pro-
hibited." Both procedures assist childless couples in conception.
Since the legislature expressly mentioned one and not the other,
the court concluded that prohibition of surrogate parenting could
not be implied.' 5
Third, the court stated that the adoption statute prohibiting
compensation was inapplicable." The reasoning on this issue was
similar to that of Judge Sorkow in the Baby M case.'7 Essentially,
the court stated that since any custody struggle would be between
the child's biological parents, and a father can neither buy nor
adopt his own child, the only applicable standard is what is in the
child's best interest.4 After holding that the corporation's actions
did not contravene the statutory prohibition against baby-selling,
the court spoke of the judiciary's proper role in deciding such con-
troversial issues. Specificially, the court stated that it is the legisla-
ture's responsibility to outline a solution, and the courts should
40. Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 81-18 (Jan. 26, 1981).
41. Surrogate Parenting Assoc., 704 S.W. 2d at 210.
42. Id. at 211.
43. Id. at 212.
44. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
45. Surrogate Parenting Assoc., 704 S.W.2d at 212.
46. Id.
47. In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987),
cert. granted, 107 N.J. 140, 526 A. 2d 203 (N.J. 1987).
48. Surrogate Parenting Assoc., 704 S.W.2d at 212.
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only participate "when a proposed solution violates individual con-
stitutional rights.... s
5. Other States' Actions
At present, at least twenty-four states have statutes prohibiting
payments in adoption situations either completely or with some
limited exceptions. Some of the exceptions in these statutes allow
payments for legal fees, medical and hospital costs, and court ap-
proved fees. 50 On the other hand, some states have considered al-
lowing monetary compensation if it is reasonable. 51 The advocates
of these proposals maintain that such statutes do not amount to
baby-selling, because the payments are only for the surrogate's ser-
vices, not consideration for relinquishment of her parental rights.2
Some state legislators have also proposed setting maximum limits
for this "reasonable" compensation. 53 Overall, the country is begin-
ning to recognize surrogate parenting as a viable alternative to re-
maining childless. States that have taken some action are attempt-
ing to meet the needs of a growing segment of their population, not
by closing their eyes to a scientific advancement that is controver-
49. Id. at 213.
50. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1986); Arizona: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-126
(1974); California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West 1987); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-
4-115 (1986); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928 (1981); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 63.212
(1985); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19 (1982); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 18-1511, 1512
(1979); Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1526, 1701-1703 (Smith-Hurd 1980); Indiana:
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9 (Burns Supp. 1985); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(2) (West
1981); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Baldwin 1982); Maryland: MD. FAM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 5-327 (1984); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 11A
(West Supp. 1987); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (West Supp. 1987); Ne-
vada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.290 (1985); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp.
1987); New York: N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1983); North Carolina: N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (1984); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.10 (Anderson 1982); South
Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4.2 (1984); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-
135 (1984); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (1978); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. §
946.716 (West 1982).
51. See Comment, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROBS. 1, 51 (1986) (citing Cal. Assembly 1707, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. § 2 (1985)).
52. See Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of
Noncoital Reproduction, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 865, 893 (1985); Note, Surrogate Mother-
hood: Contractual Issues and Remedies under Legislative Proposals, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 601,
625 (1984); Note, Surrogate Parenthood-An Analysis Of The Problems And A Solution:
Representation For The Child, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 143, 156 (1985). Contra Com-
ment, supra note 51, at 24.
53. See Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44
LA. L. REV. 1641, 1662 n.122 (1984) (discussing a 1981 Michigan bill that proposed a maxi-
mum fee for surrogates).
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sial, but by attempting to define its legal status. Although a com-
mendable endeavor, many mistakes can and have been made. A
legitimate question at this point is: Was Senate Bill 1081 a genuine
attempt to meet the needs of surrogate parenting or a mistake?
II. THE 1987 FLORIDA LEGISLATIVE SESSION
A. Summary And Legislative History of Senate Bill 1081
Originally, Senate Bill 1081 [hereinafter "the bill"], which was
introduced by Senator Ros-Lehtinen 5' on April 28, 1987, and re-
ferred to the Senate Health and Rehabilitative Services Commit-
tee, 5 contained only two brief amendments to the Florida Adop-
tion Act.5 6 Because surrogate parenting arrangements usually
involve the adoption of the child in question by the biological fa-
ther's wife, the bill's sponsors believed that the adoption statute
was the most appropriate means to regulate surrogate arrange-
ments. Specifically, the bill amends section 63.212, Florida Stat-
utes, which is entitled "Prohibited acts; penalties for violation."
First, the bill extended the statutory definition of "child" to all
children "whether born, conceived but yet unborn, or identified in
any way but not yet conceived. '5 7 Further, Senate Bill 1081 also
added a section to the statute which would outlaw any contract for
the purchase, sale, or transfer of custody or parental rights, in con-
nection with any child, in return for valuable consideration. Thus,
any contract for the sale of parental rights would remain void and
unenforceable as well as contrary to the state's public policy.
The Senate Health and Rehabilitative Services Committee's
Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1081 deleted the definition of
"mother" in section 63.032, Florida Statutes. 8 "Mother" was to be
defined as "a woman who has borne and given birth to a child,
regardless of the manner of conception. '"59 This would bring surro-
gate mothers within the statute's scope and require that any relin-
quishment of parental rights be in accordance with chapter 63,
Florida Statutes.
On May 21, 1987, the Senate Judiciary-Civil Committee's second
Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1081 made a significant addi-
54. Repub., Miami.
55. FLA. S. JouR. 199 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 28, 1987).
56. FLA. STAT. ch. 63 (1985).
57. Fla. SB 1081 (1987).
58. Fla. CS for SB 1081 (1987).
59. Id. § 1.
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tion to the legislation. The Committee's amendment to section
63.212, Florida Statutes, included an explanatory statement that
exempted payments for the mother's medical and psychological ex-
penses from the prohibition, as long as such payments were not
contingent upon the relinquishment of parental rights.6 0 Therefore,
surrogate parenting arrangements which involved compensation
beyond pregnancy-related expenses would be punishable by up to
five years imprisonment.6 1 With these proposed changes, the bill
went to the Senate floor on June 4, 1987.62
One of the primary concerns expressed in the committee hear-
ings was the bill's apparent conflict with a current statute impos-
ing fewer restrictions on family members "within the third degree"
or stepparents wishing to adopt a relative.6 3 Since in the surrogate
situation, the prospective adoptive couple is usually the child's
natural father and stepmother, legislation prohibiting what could
be considered a "family" adoption seemed to conflict with the cur-
rent law's leniency.
Supporters stressed that the surrogate mother is the child's true
mother, and argued that to allow financial gain would be degrading
to women.6 4 Therefore, this legislation emphasized protecting the
mother by redefining that term to include surrogates.6 5 This clash
of laws is actually a clash of interests-the interests of the adopt-
ing couple versus those of the natural mother. Unfortunately, the
truly innocent party, the child, is caught in the middle.
Another question raised was what constituted "pregnancy-re-
lated expenses."" The term was not adequately defined in the leg-
islation. Since a concise definition was lacking, some would argue
that these expenses include compensation for living expenses dur-
ing pregnancy. Due to the ambiguity of the term "living expenses,"
some senators argued that the bill did not properly address the
issue of compensation. 7
60. Fla. CS for CS for SB 1081, § 2 (1987).
61. FLA. STAT. ch. 775 (1985). A person found guilty of a felony in the third degree, may
be punished "by a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years." Id. at § 775.082(3)(d).
62. FLA. LEGIs., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1987 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS at 260, SB 1081.
63. FLA. STAT. § 63.212(1)(a) (1985).
64. Fla. S. Comm. on HRS, tape recording of proceedings (May 22, 1987) (on file with
committee) (statement of Senator Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, sponsor of bill) [hereinafter S. HRS
Tape].
65. Fla. CS for SB 1081, § 1(5) (1987).
66. Id. at § 2(1)(i).
67. S. HRS Tape, supra note 64.
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However, despite the controversial nature of surrogate
parenthood, the issue of compensation to surrogates did not pro-
duce a heated debate. Perhaps this is a sign of the relative ambiva-
lence among Floridians on this issue. Regardless of the general ap-
athy, the need for some type of surrogate parenthood legislation
has been recognized by the Florida Senate.
B. Other Legislation
Several other bills filed during the 1987 Legislative Session di-
rectly addressed surrogate parenting, but did not reach the Senate
floor. The two bills most squarely on point were both introduced in
the Florida Senate on April 30, 1987,68 and subsequently ended
their respective journeys through committees on June 6, 1987.69
Senate Bill 1288,70 introduced by Senator Richard H. Langley, 71
called for the creation of the Surrogate Parent Act which included
the following provisions: 1) require that both parties be repre-
sented by counsel; 2) require that a special petition be presented to
a court for its approval before drafting agreements; 3) prescribe
provisions to be outlined in surrogate parenting contracts; 4) pro-
vide the presumption that the biological father is also the legal fa-
ther; 5) allow "reasonable monetary compensation" to be paid to
surrogate mothers by way of an escrow account or attorney trust
account; 6) provide that the foregoing payments constitute com-
pensation for her "services"; 7) allow certain relief in case of
breach, including specific performance, if appropriate; and 8) pro-
vide that the act control over any conflicting laws.7 1 In essence, this
bill would have legitimized surrogate parenting arrangements pro-
vided certain conditions were met.
On the other hand, Senate Bill 1297, 3 sponsored by Senator Pat
Frank, was much less accommodating to such agreements. Senate
Bill 1297 created the Surrogate Parenthood Act which succinctly
embodied a prohibition against surrogate parenting arrangements
and imposed criminal sanctions unless specific guidelines were
68. FLA. S. JOUR. 237 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 30, 1987) (Senate Bill 1288 introduced); id. at 238
(Senate Bill 1297 introduced).
69. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1987 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS at 301, SB 1288; id. at 303, SB 1297.
70. Fla. SB 1288 (1987).
71. Repub., Clermont.
72. Fla. SB 1288 (1987).
73. Fla. SB 1297 (1987).
74. Dem., Tampa.
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strictly adhered to. These guidelines included the following: 1)
agreements must be in writing; 2) agreements must include provi-
sions establishing parental rights and child support responsibility;
3) compensation to any party is prohibited, unless to pay for preg-
nancy-related treatment; 4) intestate inheritance is prohibited un-
less it is from the parent or parents having the parental rights to
the child; and 5) violators of the act will be guilty of a felony in the
third degree. 5 The act also contained a provision declaring it a
third degree felony to implant a human egg into anything -other
than a female of the Homo Sapiens species.m
The purpose of Senate Bill 1297 was to prohibit "the commer-
cialization of surrogate parenthood and to define the appropriate
limits within which persons may make surrogate parenthood ar-
rangements."' 7 Senate Bill 1288, however, would have established
more permissive limitations on this new scientific practice. Despite
their contrasting approaches, both of these bills had one factor in
common which may have led to their early demise; both bills cre-
ated new acts dedicated solely to surrogate parenthood. "8 Perhaps
the inability of these two pieces of legislation to make it beyond
their respective committees indicates that the Florida Legislature
is unwilling to squarely confront this issue.
Other legislation, however, will have a significant affect on surro-
gate parenthood. Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1062, which
unanimously passed both houses of Florida's Legislature, amends
the existing Adoption Act, chapter 63, Florida Statutes. 79 Two as-
pects of the bill are especially important. First, it provides that in
all adoption proceedings, the courts should enter orders necessary
to "protect the best interests of the person to be adopted." 80 Sec-
ond, the bill increases the $500 limit on intermediary's fees to
$1,000 unless a larger fee can be justified.8
III. ANALYSIS
The primary function of Senate Bill 1081 was to prohibit the
compensation of the surrogate mother, which is perhaps the most
75. Fla. SB 1297 (1987).
76. Id. at 4.
77. Id. at 1-2.
78. Senate Bill 1288 proposed creating the "Surrogate Parent Act." Senate Bill 1297 pro-
posed creating the "Surrogate Parenthood Act."
79. Fla. CS for SB 1062 (1987) (proposed amendments to FLA. STAT. ch. 63).
80. Fla. CS for SB 1062, § 1 (1987).
81. Id. § 8.
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controversial aspect of the surrogate parenting arrangement.2 Al-
though some may contend that payments to the mother play a
small role in the surrogate procedure, it is likely that legislation
forbidding such payments would have an extremely adverse effect
on such arrangements.8 3
First, even though there are some prospective surrogates who
would agree to perform the service without compensation, most
would probably not endure the risks of pregnancy without it.8 ' In-
deed, some proponents of surrogate arrangements do not believe
surrogates should risk pregnancy dangers without compensation.8 5
These advocates contend that the payments serve two valuable
purposes. The most powerful justification is that the additional fee
represents compensation for the services provided by the surrogate
mother.8 6 Thus, the payments cover the risks of pregnancy and
giving birth and indemnify the surrogate for any loss of income she
sustains during the pregnancy period.8 7
Despite this, at least twenty-four states have enacted statutes
which prohibit compensation beyond expenses.88 In addition to
prohibiting payment to surrogates for the parental rights to the
child, these statutes attempt to meet the need for effective regula-
tion of surrogate arrangements. In order to thoroughly assess the
statutes' effectiveness, the positive and negative aspects of surro-
gate parenting must first be examined.
The most beneficial feature of a surrogate arrangement is that it
represents a viable alternative for infertile couples who wish to
have children.8 9 The most attractive aspect of surrogate parenting
to infertile couples is that instead of waiting years for a child
through the normal adoption procedure,90 they can have a baby in
a matter of months. The adopting father is also the biological fa-
ther. 1 Thus, the child is not adopted by strangers but is placed
with the custody of its natural father and stepmother. Since some
82. S. Judiciary-Civ. Analysis, supra note 4.
83. See Comment, supra note 34, at 235-36.
84. Id. at 231.
85. See supra note 52 and accompanying text for a list of articles contending that these
excess payments are for services rendered and therefore legitimate.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 50.
89. See supra note 7-8 and accompanying text.
90. The average waiting period for couples attempting to adopt a child is from three to
seven years. Adoption and Foster Care 1975: Hearings on Baby-Selling Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975).
91. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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states, including Florida, have enacted statutes that are less re-
strictive when children are adopted by relatives, 2 perhaps laws
aimed at regulating surrogate parenting should be more permissive
as well. 3 The unique opportunity surrogate parenting provides is
the reason so many couples are willing to go through the compli-
cated surrogate procedure.
Other positive characteristics of surrogate parenting distinguish
it from the evils commonly associated with baby-selling. First, the
surrogate agreement is prepared and signed before conception. As
a result, the surrogate is able to rationally consider the arrange-
ment without being distracted by an unwanted pregnancy and the
financial and emotional problems that accompany it. On the con-
trary, the child is not only wanted, but actively sought by the con-
tracting couple.
Surrogate parenting arrangements also provide access to family
health history that is usually not available in normal adoptions.9 5
The close relationship many surrogates establish with the couple
utilizing their services allows questions to arise about the surro-
gate's health and whether her family has a history of certain dis-
eases.9 Thus, information is shared that may be very crucial to the
health and well-being of the child.
A compelling comparison can also be made between the surro-
gate mother and her male counterpart, the sperm donor.97 The ser-
vice sperm donors provide is analogous to that of surrogate
mothers: a means through which infertile couples can become par-
ents. The only difference between the two services is that instead
of fulfilling the functions of the infertile wife, sperm donors fulfill
the functions of the infertile husband.98 No principled distinction
exists between these two surrogates. Yet, it is a common and ac-
ceptable practice to pay sperm donors.
Therefore, proponents of surrogate arrangements contend that
to allow and condone the compensation of sperm donors and to
92. See FLA. STAT. § 63.212 (1985).
93. See Coleman, supra note 16, at 113.
94. See Keane, supra note 6 and accompanying text for the definition of a "surrogate
mother." Contracting before conception is a factor common to most surrogate arrangements.
Id.
95. See Comment, supra note 51, at 23.
96. Id.
97. A sperm donor anonymously donates his semen to be artificially inseminated with
the egg of a sterile husband's fertile wife.
98. See In re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. 313, 388, 525 A.2d 1128, 1165 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1987), cert. granted, 107 N.J. 140, 526 A.2d 203 (N.J. 1987).
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deny compensation to surrogate mothers is a violation of equal
protection.99 Indeed, it could be argued that because surrogate
mothers must endure the risks and dangers of pregnancy, and
sperm donors carry out their service with virtually no risk at all,
the surrogate mothers should not only be compensated, but should
be paid more than the surrogate fathers.100 Indeed, the risk of emo-
tional attachment is far greater for surrogate mothers, who for nine
months, carry a child they know they must surrender at birth.10'
One commentator, Katie Marie Brophy, who is also the cofounder
of Surrogate Family Services, Inc. in Kentucky, accurately summa-
rizes the views of many surrogate compensation supporters:
Men can sell sperm. A man who is an anonymous donor receives
$25 for every sperm sample-which involves no pain or stress on
his body or on his social life. A surrogate is pregnant twenty-four
hours a day for nine months. She deserves to be paid for her time
and energy-not to mention the physical suffering she endures and
the risk to her health she undertakes for the adoptive parents'
benefit . 1.. .02
Lastly, many contend that surrogate parenting arrangements are
protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, which has been interpreted to guarantee the right of pri-
vacy."0 ' Through various opinions, the United States Supreme
Court has extended this right to include the right to marriage, pro-
creation, contraception, abortion, family life, and the raising of
children.1 0 4 The Court has also declared that governmental intru-
sion into these areas is prohibited. The only exception is when the
state can show a compelling interest and a remedy narrowly drawn
to meet that interest. 10 These constitutional rights could be used
to challenge legislation prohibiting surrogate parenting arrange-
ments.106 Indeed, if procreation is protected by the Constitution,
then arguably all forms of procreation are protected. However,
problems arise when certain aspects of a protected right are de-
99. See id.
100. See Griffin, supra note 7, at 31.
101. See Hollinger, supra note 52, at 894.
102. Id.
103. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
104. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
105. Griswold v. Connecticut, 481 U.S. 479 (1965).
106. S. Judiciary-Civ. Analysis, supra note 4, at 3.
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clared unlawful. For example, legislation like Senate Bill 1081 pro-
hibits compensation to surrogates. Many surrogate parenting advo-
cates argue that surrogate parenting as a whole is a protected right,
and prohibiting certain portions of it does not lessen that protec-
tion. 10 7 Consequently, prohibiting compensation necessarily uncon-
stitutionally prohibits the entire practice. As one commentator
succinctly put it, "What the state cannot overtly prohibit, it can-
not indirectly outlaw either."108
But there are also many arguments against surrogate arrange-
ments. A major concern is the question of the child's legitimacy.
Presently, twenty-eight states including Florida"0 9 have statutes
which proclaim that if the surrogate is married and her husband
consents to the insemination, it will be presumed that he (not the
biological father) is the legal father of the child." 0 These statutes
thwart the intent of surrogate parenting arrangements."' However,
many courts refuse to rebut this presumption of legitimacy for to
do so would mean labeling the child a bastard." 2 Clearly, such laws
may weaken the biological father's standing to assert his paternity
rights. 1 3
107. See Keane, supra note 6, at 162-163.
108. Id.
109. See Alabama: ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1986); Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045
(1983); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(c) (1971); California: CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005
(West 1983); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1986); Connecticut: CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45-69f & 45-69n (West 1981); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp.
1984); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1982); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 39-5405-01 (1984);
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1453 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); Kansas: KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 23-129 (1981); Louisiana: LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West Supp. 1987); Mary-
land: MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-206(b) (1974); Michigan: MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.2824 (West 1980); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 1982); Montana:
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1983); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (1985); New
Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 1987); New York: N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73
(McKinney 1986); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ] 49A]-1 (1984); Oklahoma: OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 552 (West 1987); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239 & 109.243 (1983);
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1983); Texas: TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03
(Vernon 1974); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-67.1 (1987); Washington: WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West 1986); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 891.40 (West Supp.
1986); Wyoming: WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1977).
110. FLA. STAT. § 742.11 (1985) provides: "Any child born within wedlock who has been
conceived by the means of artificial insemination is irrebuttably presumed to be legitimate,
provided that both husband and wife have consented in writing to the artificial
insemination."
111. Theoretically, surrogate parenting arrangements provide an infertile couple the op-
portunity to care for the husband's natural child. Recognizing biological paternity helps le-
gitimize the surrogate procedure.
112. See Coleman, supra note 16, at 91.
113. Id. at 91-92.
SURROGATE MOTHERS
Opponents of surrogate parenting have also focused on negative
perceptions of such arrangements. The most common is that surro-
gate motherhood is really "baby-selling." Some also contend that
when the mother relinquishes all custody rights to the child, she is
actually abandoning it."" Further, because the father is married to
someone other than the surrogate, some would argue that the par-
ties involved are committing adultery. ' 6 Lastly, some maintain
that the arrangement is merely a sophisticated form of prostitution
and is therefore inherently illegal." 6
Adultery involves sexual intercourse between two people who are
not married to each other. ' In the usual surrogate parenting situ-
ation, the conception is achieved through the process of artificial
insemination, not sexual intercourse. Another hurdle this adultery
notion finds difficult to leap is that in surrogate arrangements, the
wife who will adopt the child consents to the process." 8 Also, if the
surrogate is married, her husband usually consents to the process
as well. Consequently, all parties involved demonstrate their con-
currence with the endeavor. Thus, the adultery argument is clearly
inappropriate.
The claim that commercial surrogate parenting is actually a
form of prostitution also ignores the basic features of the proce-
dure. Prostitution entails payment for sexual favors.119 As stated
above, surrogate parenting usually does not involve any sexual ac-
tivity between the parents. Therefore, like the adultery claim, the
prostitution contention has received little support.
Perhaps the most disturbing argument against surrogate parent-
ing is the assertion that these arrangements exploit the lower clas-
ses for the benefit of the wealthy. This claim centers around what
is at the heart of Senate Bill 1081: the realization that only the
rich can afford the substantial payments to surrogates.'20 This is
true regardless of whether the payments are for surrendering pa-
rental rights, reasonable compensation for services, or any other
description those involved may wish to attach. Opponents claim
114. See Lorio, supra note 53, at 1656-57.
115. Id. at 1657.
116. Id.
117. See Keane, supra note 6, at 151.
118. Id. at 151-52.
119. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 926 (1973) defines "prostitution" as the act
or practice of "indulging in promiscuous sexual relations especially for money."
120. The normal fee is usually between $5,000 and $10,000. However, some couples pay
as much as $20,000. Granelli, Surrogate Mother Sued Over Custody Agreement, 3 NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 6, 1981, at 4, col. 2 (quoting Katie Brophy).
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that combating the unfairness stemming from surrogate arrange-
ments is one of the primary purposes of anti-baby-selling legisla-
tion similar to Senate Bill 1081.121 Accordingly, one goal of such
legislation is to ensure that adoption is available to all childless
couples regardless of financial status.
Surrogate parenting is obviously a very complex issue. It raises
the sensitive topic of the custody of a child. Legislation regulating
this practice is therefore vital. Florida Senate Bill 1081122 ad-
dressed the problem of the commercialization of the practice; but
did the bill adequately address all the intricate issues of surrogate
parenting?
Neither advocates nor opponents of surrogate parenting dispute
that legislation is needed to establish procedures to regulate surro-
gate arrangements. 123 In examining Senate Bill 1081, few would say
that it meets this need. Obviously, the other two Senate bills intro-
duced this session, Senate Bills 1288 and 1297, provide a more ex-
tensive outline for the regulation of each aspect of surrogate
parenting. Senate Bill 1081, however, addressed only one of the
many issues in surrogate arrangements, the payments for relin-
quishing parental rights.
Senate Bill 1081 was never meant to address all the issues of
surrogate parenting. The bill's original sponsor, Senator Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen, put it best when she said, "Financial gain is rele-
vant in these contracts and that's why my bill specifically relates to
the commercial aspect of these contracts."'' " Although there may
be some question about the definition of "expenses for pregnancy-
related medical or psychological care or treatment,"'12 5 the bill did
meet its goal of prohibiting financial gain from the transfer of pa-
rental rights. 2 6 In light of the fact that the bill was the first to pass
Florida Senate directly addressing surrogate parenting and will un-
doubtedly be referred to in drafting future legislation, its sponsor
and drafters should be applauded for recognizing the significance
of this issue and making an ardent effort to address it.
121. See S. HRS Tape, supra note 64.
122. Fla. CS for CS for SB 1081 (1987).
123. See Comment, Surrogate Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies under
Legislative Proposals, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 601, 637 (1984); Artificial Insemination and Sur-
rogate Motherhood-A Nursery Full of Unresolved Questions, 17 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 913,
950 (1981).
124. S. HRS Tape, supra note 64.
125. Fla. CS for CS for SB 1081 (1987).
126. Id. The bill accomplishes its purpose by imposing penalties upon those who at-
tempt to profit from surrogate arrangements.
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However, since the bill does not regulate, but rather prohibits, it
is unable to overcome one obstacle that has led to the demise of
similar legislation in other jurisdictions. In prohibiting compensa-
tion to surrogates, the bill also prohibits the very practice it at-
tempts to regulate. 127 The number of prospective surrogates is
likely to decrease tremendously if additional compensation is out-
lawed. 128 The least desirable, yet most probable consequence of
such legislation would be to drive the parties underground. 2 9
Then, none of the parties involved, especially the child, would be
protected. This situation would definitely be contrary to Florida's
public policy of ensuring the best interests of its children. What is
needed is a more enlightened regulatory scheme.
IV. ALTERNATIVES
Within the past five years, other jurisdictions have attempted to
fill the void in surrogate regulation by proposing legislation they
consider appropriate. The only state to pass legislation regulating
the practice is Arkansas.3 0 Ironically, Arkansas' statute does not
include a provision for the suggestion receiving the most support
from commentators:' the proposal that a statutory maximum fee
be set to eliminate the appearance that the parties can negotiate a
fee for the child. 132 This would also remove the danger that some
surrogates will threaten to breach the contract unless the price is
raised. Another proposal to lessen the danger of a breach is that
intensive screening of all parties should be required to ensure their
sincerity before entering into the arrangement. 3 This screening
would involve psychological as well as medical testing of the surro-
gate and the natural father. 3 4
A major question often raised by surrogate opponents is: Should
specific performance be a possible remedy in case of a breach by
the surrogate? 33 Indeed, specific performance is rarely awarded in
127. By prohibiting compensation to surrogates, Senate Bill 1081 essentially outlaws the
practice itself because compensation is usually a major incentive for surrogates. This short-
coming is inherent in all legislation which merely prohibits compensation without detailing
further guidelines.
128. See Newman & Newman, supra note 10, at 127.
129. See Comment, supra note 34, at 235-36.
130. See Lorio, supra note 53, at 1665.
131. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34.721 (Supp. 1985).
132. Hollinger, supra note 52, at 895.
133. Comment, supra note 51, at 44.
134. Id.
135. Comment, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611, 620 (1978).
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personal service contracts, due to the prohibition against involun-
tary servitude. This concern is heightened in surrogate parenting
situations, because few courts would require that a woman, who
has freedom of choice when it comes to her body, be impregnated,
carry a child to term, and surrender it at birth, against her will. 136
However, at least one commentator believes courts should permit
specific performance because to do otherwise would greatly harm
the rights of the father. 117
Interestingly, a 1985 proposal made by the District of Columbia
Council addressed one of the shortcomings of bills similar to Sen-
ate Bill 1081, the insufficient definition of "pregnancy-related ex-
penses." 13 8 The proposal listed the following expenses: 1) medical,
psychiatric and psychological tests and treatment directly related
to the pregnancy before, during, and after pregnancy; 2) all legal
representation fees incurred in drafting the agreement; 3) medica-
tions and special foods prescribed by a physician that are directly
related to the pregnancy; 4) maternity clothing; and 5) any loss of
income incurred as a direct result of the pregnancy. 39 Although
this definition may not be exactly what the Florida bill's drafters
contemplated, it does offer some guidelines.
Other suggestions range from requiring immediate paternity
testing, to granting the child access to all surrogate information
upon his eighteenth birthday.14 0 The two other Florida surrogate
bills introduced this session contain many of the commonly recom-
mended practices.14 '
V. CONCLUSION
Surrogate parenting is no longer a gleam in a scientist's eye; it is
a reality, and it deserves recognition. This process has given many
childless couples something they never had before: a choice. It is
also a novel concept with many legal stumbling blocks. However,
many believe that a concentrated effort to surmount these
problems can be successful.
136. Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96
YALE L.J. 187, 202-03 (1986).
137. See Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate
Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1955 (1986).
138. Comment, supra note 51, at 51 (citing D.C. Council 6-152 § 5 (1985)).
139. Id. at 51 n.257.
140. See id. at 50.
141. Fla. SB 1288 (1987); Fla. SB 1297 (1987).
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The Florida Senate has recognized the need for action. Although
Florida courts have yet to be confronted with this issue, they can
be assured that it will continue to stretch far beyond the Florida
Senate floor and will eventually find its way into their tribunals.
But before these issues can be adequately addressed, Florida's
Legislature must choose from among the many alternative schemes
of regulation available. Simply prohibiting surrogate arrangements
will only lead to greater confusion. If this occurs, the parties in-
volved will be left without any protection or notion as to the na-
ture of their remedies and rights. This scenario would be contrary
to Florida's compelling interest in protecting and ensuring the wel-
fare of its children.
Undoubtedly, Florida's Legislature will face the surrogate
parenting issue again. Some lawmakers may propose legislation de-
claring it a form of baby-selling. Certainly, we cannot allow legisla-
tors' ideals of a perfect society to cloud their responsibility. In an
ideal world there would be no couples who desperately want a
child, but are unable to conceive. As one family law expert put it,
"We must consider the felt needs of the people. Surrogate mother-
hood just might be an idea whose time has come."' 42
142. Dr. Doris Jonas Freed as quoted in Griffin, supra note 7, at 47.
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